External Aid to India by Saxena, Naresh C.
1 Insignificant quantum
From the perspective of donors, India is an
important recipient country. Both for the
multilaterals such as theWorld Bank and theUnited
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), or the
bilaterals such as UK and The Netherlands, the
share of aid to India in their total aid basket is quite
significant.However, per capita assistance and aid
as a percentage of India’s Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) is much less than that of other developing
countries, and has declined over the years. The
annual disbursement of total aid to India (about
US$3.6bn, counting both loans and grants)
translates into per capita assistance of roughly
US$3.5 per year, which is just 5 per cent of what
Egypt receives. According to a World Bank study,
aid to India was only 0.3 per cent of its Gross
National Product (GNP) in 2002–03, whereas the
corresponding figures for Uganda, Pakistan, and
Vietnam were 11.2, 3.6 and 3.6, respectively. Aid
as a percentage of total government expenditure in
India is about 2 per cent at the time of writing, and
is declining sharply every year.
Most aid is concessional/semi-concessional, i.e.
at nominal/lower rates of interest and with longer
maturity periods. In addition, civil society received
US$1.05bn1 during 2000–01 from international
not-for-profit organisations. This includes a large
number of religious trusts, although they may also
be spending on rural development, healthcare and
relief.
In absolute terms, while external receipts
including grants have not been increasing, total
repayment has increased. But the external debt to
GDP ratio fell from41 per cent in 1991–2 to 22 per
cent in 1999–2000, and to 17.6 per cent by end of
March 2004.
1.1 Overall assessment of aid
External assistance, while not very large
quantitatively, is of considerable significance in
qualitative terms. First, it creates an additionality
of resources for social and infrastructure sectors,
the twomost important areas of concern in India’s
development policy. Second, international agencies
maintain proper documentation of pre-project
studies which leads to better design of projects.The
donors send a teamevery six months to the project
areas and the lessons learnt are used for mid-course
corrections. This is followed by mid-term and final
evaluations. They also fund research projects on
socioeconomic issues relevant to that sector.Because
of the wealth of data generated by the donor
promoted consultancies, it becomes possible to
identify and pinpoint the shortfalls that occurred,
as well as the problems faced in the implementation
of various earlier projects.Third, external assistance
promotes the interaction of government officers
with academicians and professionals from several
disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, tribal
development, economics, ecology and rural
development.
Fourth, there is a great variety in patterns of
assistance and also in fund flows (often funds are
given to non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
with government knowledge or approval, thus
promoting government-NGO partnership),
showing the flexibility and adaptability of donors
to meet specific needs of the line ministries. Fifth,
such programmes are comparatively isolated from
political interference, and contracts are generally
decided on professional rather than patronage
considerations.2 Sixth, it brings with it innovative
schemes and projects that make a qualitative
difference and add value to development
programmes. External assistance enables the
recipient to draw upon the best practices which are
prevalent in particular sectors worldwide. These
best practices, when adapted to local requirements,
help in enhancing the impact and effectiveness of
the programmes, besides bringing about attitudinal
changes. Finally, it is generally felt that the outcomes
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of externally aided projects (EAPs) aremuch better
than the other non-aided schemes. This is not only
due to closemonitoring, to the greater interest taken
by state government officials in donor-assisted
programmes.
At the same time, the limitations of external aid
should also have to be borne in mind.
● EAPs demand local contributions that often leave
the fund-starved states very littlemoney for other
activities in that sector. For instance, social
forestry on non-forest lands in the 1980s
deprived forest lands of resources.3 Often, once
an external project is sanctioned, the state
FinanceDepartment reduces the plan allocation
for other schemes of that line department –
diverting savings tomeet ways andmeans crises
and thus, no additionality is created for that
sector. This also diminishes incentive for any
department to go for external funding.And while
the total money does not increase in the
development budget, a great deal gets spent on
consultancies especially involving foreign
experts,4 leaving less for grassroots activities.
● There is often emphasis under the EAPs on
achieving immediate success rather than
sustainability.
● State government officers do not take much
interest at the time of the formulation of projects,
leaving the crucial decisions on priorities to
donor-appointed consultants who may not be
aware of the field conditions. Sometimes very
expensive projects are selected, such as the Sodic
Lands in Uttar Pradesh by the World Bank
(where the cost of reclamation of land is
US$1,578 per hectare), which are hardly
replicable, given the resource position of the
state government. Such projects, though quite
successful, have little learning value.
● Foreign money is seen as easy money and the
governments do not undertake close scrutiny
of the projects prepared by the consultants, with
the result that the projects end up by increasing
the dependency syndrome. Such projects have
often led to rapid expansion in staff or jeeps or
other such non-productive expenditure, such
as in the Social Forestry World Bank Projects
Phase I and II (1979–92), and in the T&V
Scheme in the Agriculture Sector.5
● The projects take a great deal of time at the design
and sanction level (sometimes more than three
years) which exhausts the patience of officers,
who unfortunately have a short-termperspective.
● Inter-donor coordination is weak.
Finally, a great deal of international experience
is now available about why aid to poor countries
has largely failed to spur growth or relieve poverty.
It can work only if aid is accompanied by good
governance and sound economic policies. For
instance, aid has worked in Botswana which had
good economic policies soundly administered; but
not in Zambia, which had neither. Thus the focus
of donors should shift to improving governance,
rather than merely providing funds for schemes.
Though the donors in India are keen to enter this
important but complex arena, governments –
especially the national government – are allergic to
donors giving advice on governance.Nevertheless,
many World Bank and Asian Development Bank
(ADB) documents are laden with sermons on
governance6 and macropolicies. This is, however,
the prerogative of large donors – smaller donors
are not encouraged by national government to
“meddle” in policy matters.
Despite these limitations, one can sum up that
external assistance brings with it new ideas, new
technologies and fresh thinking. The advantages
of these spread well beyond the projects to which
they are directly applied. They are often replicated
(Joint Forest Management and self-help credit
groups are good examples) and this replication can
trigger a change which spreads over and across
projects and sectors.
2 The 2003 guidelines
In June 2003, the Government of India (GoI)
announced a new policy for bilateral development
assistance. The policy essentially prescribes an end
to grant as well as credit assistance from small
bilateral donors to theGoI and state governments.
It states that instead, small donor agencies are
welcome to provide support to the Indian civil
society and to channel funds through multilateral
organisations. Themultilateral partners, who were
so far exempt from this restriction, have also been
asked to give grants only to the registered
organisations. Each bilateral partner will submit
the list of organisations it wishes to assist to the
concerned Joint Secretary, who would convene a
meeting with the bilateral partner, wherein the
government’s response on the various proposals
IDS Bulletin 36.3 Increased Aid: Minimising Problems, Maximising Gains
56
would be conveyed. The partner is expected to
suitably modify the list, in light of these suggestions.
Clearly, the Indian government has tried to signal
a change in its status from “aid-taker” to “aid-giver”.
It would like the world to believe that India is now
a prosperous country with burgeoning foreign
exchange reserves and no longer needs concessional
finance.Affected bilaterals were gratuitously advised
that their humanitarian assistance could be better
utilised elsewhere for people and countries more
in need. It may be recalled that the Planning
Commission in its 10th Plan (2002–07) has
advocated a greater flow of aid, especially
concessional aid, while the Finance Ministry has
acted just in the opposite direction.
The new policy of routing funds of small donors
to NGOs, universities and other research
organisations would have great merit if it leads to
the professionalisation of theNGO sector in India.
Today they are largely dependent on government
funding, but to maintain their independence and
autonomy they must havemultiple sources of funds.
Too much dependence on governments (central
and state) which are not able to monitor its grants
or which give grants on a patronage basis, has led
to the mushrooming of the wrong kind of
organisations – which has given a bad name to the
entire NGO movement. With the bilateral funds
going straight toNGOs, at least the genuineNGO
will have a better chance of receiving grants on
merit and on the basis of their past work and future
potential. A vibrant and confident civil society is
the best safeguard in a democracy against the abuse
of power by the executive.
The best solution will of course be to give civil
society access to foreign funds without any reference
to the government. If there is a need to prohibit
certain organisations from easy access to funds,
government can intervene.
The new guidelines may, however,make it more
difficult for NGOs to access donor funds in several
ways.
First, smaller NGOs, which could earlier get
assistance fromUN organisations will now have to
seek official clearance, thereby restricting the flow
of aid only to older (clearance is issued only to those
organisations that have been in operation for more
than three years) and larger organisations.
Second, previously many groups without
clearance could get bilateral funds if such funds
went directly to them after an agreement with a line
ministry (since it was presumed that theministries
had applied prudence in the selection of NGOs).
Under the new regime, they are deprived of such
assistance.
Third, as these guidelines do not apply to certain
exempted bilaterals (such as the Department of
International Development, DFID), there are two
different procedures for anNGO to get grants from
the bilaterals. The irony is that the procedure for
getting grants from exempted bilaterals is simpler
– even though for them, giving funds to NGOs is
not a priority. But to receive grants from smaller
bilaterals whose main task is now to assist civil
society (and who will presumably set up new
mechanisms for monitoring and reviewing such
grants), added scrutiny is envisaged, which does
not seem logical or helpful to the growth of civil
society.
Fourth, the procedure for obtaining grants
outside India from international donors has not
been changed, and an Indian NGO with official
clearance can easily obtain grants from them without
any scrutiny. This is again anomalous, as donors
based in India with supposedly better monitoring
capability are subject to greater scrutiny, whereas
donors withmuch less scope for eye-to-eye contact
with the recipients are left free.
Fifth, earlier most bilaterals could give grants to
NGOs holding official clearance without any
reference to an organ of government.Now all such
cases must obtain official clearance, twice over –
from theMinistry of External Affairs (for political
clearance) and from the lineministry (for technical
approval). Since these ministries are not likely to
have information on each applicant, the chances
of their referring such cases to state governments
cannot be ruled out. It will not only deter civil
society from taking up policy advocacy issues
(where they oppose government policies) for fear
of losing a source of funding, but donors may
hesitate to suggest organisations involved in
advocacy grants.Uncertainty about approvals will
also shift the attention of donors frommonitoring
outcomes in the field to liaising with the officials
of government departments, reminding one of the
licence–permit raj mentality. It is interesting that
the national government justified stopping the flow
of “small” aid in the name of reducing transaction
costs, but ended up by increasing its involvement
in processing individual grant applications toNGOs.
Sixth, the quantum of aid that each country
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brings to India is decided by their respective
parliaments. In some countries (such as The
Netherlands) the ratio of bilateral aid to that
earmarked for multilaterals is fixed, and therefore
funds that were available to the respective embassies
in Delhi are more likely to be diverted to other
countries rather than to NGOs or multilaterals
working in India. It will be hard for the parliaments
to vote grants for India which are to be routed
through their embassies for the same amounts that
were being voted in the past. Thus the policy will
certainly reduce the total quantum of aid flowing
to India.
Seventh, Indian NGOs will find even the
international NGOs will give them lower priority
because the FinanceMinistry’s announcement has
created an impression that India does not need
external aid. Foreign parliaments and governments
often do not make a distinction between the Indian
government and Indian civil society. Since a large
number of countries are chasing a small amount of
aid, it is more likely to flow to those countries where
procedures are simpler and not riddled with
uncertainty.
And lastly,many of these “smaller donors” such
as the Scandinavians are in per capita terms, the
largest donors to multilaterals like the UN. They
also occupy crucial places on the boards of the IMF
and World Bank. Once they are told that India is
prosperous and no longer needs their assistance,
are they likely to support Indian claims for resources
from these bodies?
It may be mentioned here that the GoI
announced in September 2004 that it has reviewed
the existing policy and henceforth bilateral
development assistance will be accepted from all
G8 countries, as well as the EuropeanCommission.
Regarding the countries of the European Union
outside theG8, bilateral development cooperation
from such countries which provide a minimum
bilateral aid package (of US$25m per annum) is
also welcome. The press note added:
The other countries not covered by the above
policy may consider providing bilateral aid
directly to autonomous institutions, universities,
NGOs, etc. as before. A simplified policy to
facilitate the flow of bilateral assistance to non-
governmental organisations and autonomous
institutions will be announced shortly.
However, no new procedure has been
operationalised on the ground, nor has the policy
been communicated to the donors, or the new
guidelines revised as of February 2005. Proposals
from the NGOs are still subject to bureaucratic
scrutiny as last year. So it is business as usual.
2.1 Absorbing greater aid
India uses internally borrowed funds (at market
rates) for its expenditure on development, putting
great stress on its fiscal deficit. The central
government’s devolution to the states (including
both, through the Planning and Finance
Commissions) at US$371bn a year is comparable
with its fiscal deficit. Though the World Bank
President announced twice (in 2000 and then in
2004) during his visits to India that the Bank would
happily increase InternationalDevelopment Agency
(IDA) credit to India from US$1–2bn a year, the
Government of India took no steps to avail itself of
this offer.
2.2 Indifference to foreign aid is explained
by several things
1. Dependence on foreign aid is seen as against
national interests – a Nehruvian andGandhian
legacy that overstresses self sufficiency. The
impression that foreign money is dirty money
and is used to “destabilise the nation” is very
strong in India. This is the viewpoint not only
of politicians but also the press. None of the
smaller Indian states which would lose from the
withdrawal of bilateral donors made a public
announcement about their displeasure with the
new policy. The lobby seeking liberalisation of
aid flows to the government andNGOs is weak
in India.
2. Sincemost aid is for poverty reduction and social
sectors, subjects which are under the domain of
state governments, the national government
fears that greater aid will mean greater control
by the donors of public policy at the state level.
Many times in the last five years the central
government complained to theWorld Bank and
other donors about dealing with states directly,
insisting that they route their communications
only through New Delhi. This delays the flow
of aid and is against developing a sense of
ownership amongst the states.
3. The only way more aid can be absorbed in India
is if it is not in project mode, but is direct budget
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support with greater flexibility to the recipient
states to decide its utilisation. The institutional
problems and high transaction costs that
accompany multitudes of projects are then
avoided. Direct budget support is a form of
programme aid: it is used by donors as amodality
for supporting a plan or policy programme
developed by the recipient government,
channelled directly into the financial
management, accountability and procurement
system of the recipient country. These features
are intended to strengthen country-ownership
of policy and policy making, to develop
government and administrative capacity
(especially for financial planning and
management), and to improve aid effectiveness.
Although theWorld Bank and theADB (but not
DFID) have been permitted in the past to provide
programme loans to the states, theGovernment
of India has never been happy about this
initiative and has generally discouraged it.
4. Central government ministries have no incentive
to chase aid funds, as their plan allocation does
not increase when they receive external funds.
The proposal of the Planning Commission that
external aid should be over and above the plan
(as it is for the states) has never found favour
with the FinanceMinistry.
5. Though all Indian states in the not-so-distant
past had excellent financial systems to absorb
aid (both internal and external), administration
in the poorer states has lately come under great
stress, which affects not only the utilisation of
external funds, but also central funds received
from the central government. Even IDA
assistance remains undisbursed. Fund flows
from the central to the state governments, and
from state governments to projects,
procurement/contractual delays, and
conditionalities related to projects are some of
the main reasons for the poor utilisation of aid.
6. Poorer states are under great fiscal stress, and
are often not in a position to provide matching
funds either for donor funds or for central
government schemes. Therefore donors should
providematching funds to the states so that they
can attract more central funds, especially in
schemes that directly benefit the poor. It is
understood that such a proposal was made by
theOrissa Government to DFID, but it did not
find favour with DFID.
Since aid forms only an insignificant part of total
state government expenditure (2 per cent inUttar
Pradesh and 4 per cent in Orissa), the issue that
needs examination is how one steps up utilisation
of central funds and states’ own plan funds – rather
than merely looking at the absorption of external
aid alone. Some of these constraints are as follows:
● State governments seldom get their full annual
budget passed by the legislature. Instead, the
budget is passed in two instalments, first for four
months and later for the full year. This increases
paperwork and delays the allotment of funds,
keeping implementing agencies waiting.
● Some states, such as Bihar, have concentrated
the powers of issuing financial approvals with
the Chief Minister or Cabinet. This delays the
whole process of issuing approvals by several
months.
● A large number of vacancies in field posts implies
that the power to approve expenditure is not
with the person who has the temporary
responsibility for that office.
● Too little decentralisation has occurred, and even
senior officials have limited financial powers.
● Some states (e.g.Orissa) cannot find matching
funds (because of financial stress) to access
central funds, which also has implications for
external aid.
In addition to these constraints on maximising
expenditure, there are also problems of leakages
and inefficient delivery. This in turn requires
improving the governance, productivity and
accountability of government machinery. Perverse
incentives (short tenure, promotions based on
seniority and not merit, important posts given on
the basis of political clout rather than performance)
are not the only factors undermining the
effectiveness of the bureaucracy. Its composition is
also skewed. For instance, inmost states, about 70
per cent of all government employees are support
staff unrelated to public service – drivers, peons
and clerks. Key public services – education,
healthcare, police and the judiciary – are starved
of people, whereas many wings are overstaffed. It
is not that Indian bureaucrats are bad; in fact many
are smart, hard-working, and dedicated
professionals. But the perverse incentives that they
face explain the government’s indifferent
performance. Bureaucracy works best where there
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is strong feedback from beneficiaries, strong
incentives for the bureaucracy to respond to such
feedback, easily observable outcomes, a high
probability that bureaucratic effort will translate
into favourable outcomes and competitive pressure
from other bureaucracies and agencies. Such
conditions do not exist in many poorer states of
India.
The concept of good governance needs to be
translated into a quantifiable annual index on the
basis of certain agreed indicators such as infant
mortality rate, extent of immunisation, literacy rate
for women, gender ratio, feeding programmes for
children, availability of safe drinking water supply,
electrification of rural households, rural and urban
unemployment, percentage of girls married below
18 years, percentage of villages not connected by
all weather roads, number of Class I government
officials prosecuted and convicted for corruption
and so on. Central transfers should be linked to
such an index. Some universally accepted criteria
for good budgetary practices may also be included
in the index. Once these figures are publicised,
states may compete to improve their scores.
3 Summing up
Despite satisfactory economic growth in India in
the last two decades, social indicators continue to
stagnate and the MDG targets seem difficult to
achieve. Fast progress in the livelihood sector would
need more foreign aid, especially on soft terms,
simplified procedures and institutional reforms
towards better governance.Above all, theMinistries
of ExternalAffairs and Finance, which decide how
much aid India should aspire for,must change their
anti-aid posture and act in the interest of millions
of the poor and deprived who stand to benefit with
greater flow of aid to the country.
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Notes
1. 1 crore = 10 million; US$1 = 43.5 Rs in 2005; US$1m =
4.35 crore Rs.
2. Secretary, a State Public Works Department, once told
me that many PWD engineers were keen to come back
from the World Bank Roads Project to the normal
Provincial Division, where supervision is lax and
opportunities to take commissions were higher.
3. In hindsight, it would have been more cost effective to
regenerate degraded forests than barren wastelands.
4. According to a DFID report (August 1999) the donor
produced 160 consultancy reports for the smallHimachal
Pradesh forestry project of Rs 40 crores, in two districts.
Many of these reports have never been read, let alone
acted upon by finance department (FD) staff. It caused
a tremendous burden to the local staff. The gainers were
the British Universities (Mid-term Appraisal of the 9th
Plan: 332.
5. A senior official of the FD recently toldme that theWorld
Bank had no moral authority to ask the Uttar Pradesh
Government to cut down on its staff now, as maximum
increase in staff and non-plan expenditure had taken
place due to the Bank’s projects in the past.
6. Improving governance is the explicit and main plank of
the 10th PlanDocument for reaching the desired targeted
growth. It is difficult to understand why theMinistry of
External Affairs officials get upset when the European
donors talk about the subject.
